Greg Detre
Tuesday, 23 April, 2002
empiricism + rationalism
realism + idealism???
give a brief introduction to Locke on ideas, and his different types and applications of the term, and mention some of the seeming ambiguities in his use of the term
briefly describe what�s termed his �veil of perception� doctrine, or �indirect representative realist theory of perception
then describe Mackie�s account of his distinction between primary and secondary qualities
Russell (in the History of Western Philosophy) is somewhat scathing about Locke�s philosophising � he claims that Locke�s influence outweighs his insight and that much of Locke�s work can be seen as a illumination of the intellectual climate of the time. He regards him as a man who places more importance in common sense than logic; credibility over internal consistency. For instance, though Locke�s arguments for the primary/secondary qualities distinction were flawed, the idea has been of enormous value to science right up until it was displaced by quantum theory.
Locke, Berkeley and Hume are empiricists insofar as they premise the fundamental role of experience
experience = chiefly means sensory experience (i.e. the five senses), aided when necessary by such instruments as telescopes + microscopes
but it also includes introspective awareness of the contents and operations of the experiencer�s own mind
two connected kinds of empiricism:
experience is said to be the source of concepts
experience is said to be the guarantee of their legitimacy
rationalism = only the exercise of reason, or innate endowment, can furnish us with knowledge
(e.g. the formal deductive system, like geometry or logic � excogitation from first principles, self-evident truths or definitions)
the only proper objects for knowledge are changeless truths (rather than the contingent matters of empirical enquiry)
empiricists argue that:
analytic truths (�what is being predicated of the subject is already implicit in the subject�) are empty
rationalist respond that:
experience only provides contingent knowledge
how then can empiricists accept realism (of the physical world = that the world exists independently of experience), if they dismiss claims about what transcends experience?
Locke was particularly keen to attack the doctrine of innate ideas (we are born with a significant level of knowledge, especially about the fundamentals of theology, morality and logic)
necessary in order to explain how we have access to ultimate truths (e.g. goodness, reason and God) without having learnt them by experience
this doctrine is also used to support the divine right of kings, given Locke political reason to attack it
there are (at least) two forms of innatism:
strong form: we are born with knowledge (knowing a number of propositions), e.g. Plato
weaker form: we are born with capacities for acquiring knowledge (compatible with Locke�s view that all knowledge is ultimately based on experience)
Locke often appears to have an imagistic and sensory sense in which he thinks of �idea�, but he does extend the term much more broadly than that
ideas
= �whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ�d about in thinking�
= �whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding�
they come from experience (two forms):
1. sensation � observation of external sensible objects
2. reflection � internal observation of the operations of one�s own mind
distinguishes between:
simple ideas = the atoms of experience, building-blocks, passively received by the mind in sensation (or reflection)
e.g. colours, tastes
two consistent but not equivalent definitions:
experiential criterion: �one uniform Appearance, or Conception, in the Mind�, and cannot be distinguished into component ideas
logical/semantic criterion: those whose names are not capable of being defined
complex ideas = composed wholly of combined simple ideas
classified complex ideas under three heads (first edition of the Essay):
1. substance = ideas of things
2. modes = ideas of their properties
3. relations = ideas of their relations with each other
psychological account (fourth edition of the Essay) � given in terms of the mind�s ability to:
combine � produces complexity
compare � produces relation
abstract � produces general ideas (e.g. man, dog, whiteness)
imprecision of the term �idea�, used in different senses:
1. states of mind such as feelings and sensations
2. acts of thinking such as considering and paying attention
3. images or pictures in the mind�s eye
4. concepts � sometimes the act of conceiving and sometimes the concept (i.e. generalisation from particular instances) itself
5. intermediaries between minds and objects
the function of ideas is to serve as signs
the function of a sign is to stand for/represent something other than itself
veil of perception doctrine = sensory ideas are intermediaries between the mind and whatever the mind is related to in experience
e.g. a table viewed from different perspectives/circumstances etc. has different sizes/shapes etc., but we still consider it to be the same thing
our perception of the table is mediated by the ideas it produces in our minds(???)
�For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas�
�Ideas of primary qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not. From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,- that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves�
this distinction seems to presuppose a representative theory of perception
RTP = �a contrast between percepts or sense-data or ideas as immediate objects of perception and material things which are the more remote or indirect objects of perception�
qualities = the various powers of objects to produce ideas in us
but he then identifies as primary qualities: �solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number�
but these are not powers � rather �they�re intrinsic properties of things which may be the grounds or bases of powers, and they are �modifications of matter in the bodies�� (Mackie)
examples of secondary qualities: �colours, sounds, tastes etc.�
these are identified with powers � they are �nothing in the objects themselves, but [except] powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts� (Locke)
this is often misread as saying that the secondary qualities are not in the objects at all, only �in the mind�
secondary qualities are meant by Locke as the powers of things to produce ideas in our minds, not the ideas themselves
the distorted view had become the current usage, and Berkeley confuses it too
according then to Mackie, Locke�s �official terminology is that
while there are ideas both of primary and secondary qualities, and all such ideas are in our minds,
the primary qualities are the intrinsic properties of material things, large of small � that is, shape, size, number, motion-or-rest, and solidity �
and the secondary qualities are powers of material things, whose basis is the primary qualities of the minute parts of those things�
�Locke includes under the heading �secondary qualities� both
powers to produce ideas of colours and so on in us
and powers to produce changes in other bodies, e.g. the power of the sun or of a fire to melt wax�
|
Intrinsic
features of material things = �PQ� |
Powers
of material things |
Items
�in minds� |
|
Shape, size, number, position, solidity, motion-or-rest (i) on large scale = ground of power (i) |
(i) Power to produce ideas of PQ (ii) Power to produce ideas of SQ |
Shapes etc. as we see and feel them = �Ideas of PQ� Colours as we see them, sounds as we hear them etc. = �Ideas of SQ� |
|
(ii) of minute parts = ground of powers (ii) (iii) and (usually) (iv) |
(iii) Power to produce pain, sickness etc. (iv) Power to produce changes in other things _________ Powers (ii), (iii), & (iv) = �SQ� |
Pain, sickness etc. |
if this was the distinction that Locke was trying to draw, it presupposes a RTP by contrasting ideas in minds and intrinsic features of external material things
while our ideas of both primary and secondary qualities correspond to and systematically represent real differences in external things, it is with the primary qualities alone that our ideas fairly faithfully depict what is there in the things